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NOTES
BRANTLEY v. CARLSBAD IRRIGATION
DISTRICT: LIMITS OF THE TEMPLETON
DOCTRINE AFFIRMED

WATER LAW-TEMPLETON DOCTRINE-Application to change a
water right from a surface to an underground point of diversion
denied where the groundwater came from the same source as the
surface supply, but was not itself a source of the surface supply at
the point of surface diversion. Brantley v. Carlsbad IrrigationDis, 587 P.?d 427 (1978).
trict, __ N.M.

It is well-established that surface waters and groundwaters are
often physically interrelated.' Where underground water contributes
to a source of surface water, production of the underground water
can result in a lowering of the water table and a subsequent impairment of the surface water supply. 2 Under the doctrine of prior
appropriation, the owners of senior water rights can enjoin the
appropriation of any public waters, including groundwaters, whenever these appropriations would impair their superior rights. 3 And,
because in New Mexico, as in most western states, surface water
rights tend to be older than adjacent ground water rights,4 serious
conflicts between surface water users and users of tributary groundwaters arise. Surface diversions require maintenance of high water
tables and the production of underground water must therefore,
necessarily be restricted if production from surface sources is to
continue. Unless the owners of surface water rights are allowed to
change from a surface to an underground point of diversion, the
exercise of their prior rights can impede the development of entire
underground water basins.
New Mexico draws a statutory distinction between surface and
ground waters and essentially treats them as separate sources.' Until
1958, the owner of a surface right could not change to an underground point of diversion without applying for a new water right.
1. TREWARTHA, et al., FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 174 (3rd ed.
1977).
2. The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized this effect in the case of Templeton v.
Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 65 N.M. 59, 65-66, 332 P.2d 465, 469 (1958).
3. N.M. Const., art. 16. See also City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, .71 N.M. 428, 379
P.2d 73, 80-81 (1963).
4. CHANDLER, ELEMENTS OF WESTERN WATER LAW 28 (1913).
5. See generally N.M. STAT. ANN. Ch. 72 (1953).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

With the case of Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy,6
the New Mexico Supreme Court attempted to effect a partial solution to this problem. The Templeton case involved an application to
change the point of diversion of a surface water right on the Rio
Felix to a shallow well in the surrounding alluvium, or Valley Fill.
The State Engineer denied the application because the waters of the
Valley Fill were entirely appropriated. The court, however, granted
the application after finding that the waters of the Rio Felix were
supplied almost entirely by percolations from the Valley Fill and
that the Rio Felix was diminishing due to increased pumping from
the Valley Fill. The court concluded that an appropriation of water
from the Rio Felix was in fact an appropriation of Valley Fill water.
In such a case a surface water appropriator whose water fails at his
point of surface diversion is entitled to follow his water to its source
in a related aquifer. 7
The Templeton Doctrine has been applied in a variety of situations. It has been used to impose on senior appropriators the burden
of drilling supplemental wells before they could be granted the
traditional benefits of a priority call. 8 And, it has been the basis for a
finding of forfeiture where no applications for supplemental wells
were filed after the surface water supply failed. 9 The Doctrine has
been interpreted to allow appropriators to rely on any sources of
their water at the surface point of diversion, even if those sources
contributed only a portion of the original appropriation.' 0 But a
number of questions still remain regarding the extent of the Templeton Doctrine's applicability.' The case of Brantley v. CarlsbadIrrigation District' 2 is the latest New Mexico interpretation of this
important doctrine.
George Brantley, the applicant in this case, had rights to irrigate
445 acres of land with 3 acre-feet of water per acre per annum from
the Pecos River. His rights were acquired from the United States and
had a priority date of 1887. Since 1932, Brantley's water had been
supplied through an irrigation ditch maintained by the Carlsbad Irrigation District which diverted his appropriation from a site on the
Pecos River. Because of seepage and evaporation along the twenty6. 65 N.M. 59, 332 P.2d 465 (1958).
7. k4 at 68-69, 332 P.2d at 471.
8. Flint, Groundwater Law and Administration: a New Mexico Viewpoint, 14 ROCKY
MT. MIN. L. INST. 545, 562 (1968).
9. State ex rel. Reynolds v. South Springs Co., 80 N.M. 144, 452 P.2d 478 (1969).
10. Langenegger v. Carlsbad Irrigation District, 82 N.M. 416,483 P.2d 297 (1971).
11. Flint, supra at 560-61.
12.
-N.M.
-, 587 P.2d 427 (1978).
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eight mile ditch, however, only 2.1 acre feet per acre were delivered
to Brantley's farm. In 1976, Brantley applied for a permit to withdraw groundwater to supplement his surface water. The entire
amount from both diversions was not to exceed his 3 acre-feet
entitlement. The State Engineer denied the application because the
proposed diversion would constitute a new diversion from a fully
appropriated source. Brantley appealed the State Engineer's decision
to the District Court of Eddy County. Following a trial de novo, his
application was effectively granted. The State Engineer and the Carlsbad Irrigation District appealed to the New Mexico Supreme Court
which reversed the trial court's decision.
Brantley's application for a change of point of diversion was
similar to an application denied in the case of Kelley v. Carlsbad
Irrigation District.1 3 In Kelley, the applicant had asked to have his
water diverted into an abandoned reservoir which, because of holes
in its base, allowed water to percolate rapidly into the underground
basin. He then sought to change his point of diversion to this underground basin. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied his application, holding that when surface water in which rights existed reached
an underground basin, through percolation, seepage or otherwise, it
immediately lost its identity as water subject 1to
existing rights and
4
became public water, subject to appropriation.
Brantley, however, attempted to bring his case under the Templeton Doctrine. He relied on language in Templeton stating that "an
appropriation when made follows the water to its source whether
through surface or subterranean streams or through percolations."' I
He argued that the source of his water was the Pecos River, and that
under the Doctrine it did not matter whether he took his water from
the ditch or from the shallow aquifer into which the water had
seeped. The issue was, therefore, whether the Templeton Doctrine
allows a supplemental point of diversion from an aquifer which receives water from the same source as the original surface right, even
though the aquifer itself never contributed to the water right at its
point of surface diversion.
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the Templeton Doctrine did not apply here because the groundwater that Brantley
wanted to divert was not a source of his surface right. The court
found that Brantley was actually seeking to recapture water lost to a
13. 76 N.M. 466, 415 P.2d 849 (1966).
14. Id at 472, 415 P.2d at 853.
15. 93 C.J.S. Waters §170 (1956), quoted in Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 65 N.M. at 67 n. 16, 332 P.2d at 470.
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declared underground basin' 6 which was also a source of a fully
appropriated surface flow. Under these circumstances, the ruling in
the Kelley case controlled:
One having a right in a surface flow, which has ... been lost to the

underground reservoir, can neither transfer his surface right nor
change his point of diversion to the underground reservoir.' 7
CONCLUSION

The court's holding in Brantley is consistent, not only with its
holding in the Kelley case, but with the very purpose for which the
Templeton Doctrine was created. The Templeton decision was
intended to facilitate the full development of tributary groundwaters
by allowing appropriators of surface waters, whose volumes have
diminished, to supplement their appropriations by drilling wells upstream into the underground sources of their surface water. 1 8 As
such, the Doctrine has proven to be a useful tool in managing
groundwater basins and their related surface sources.' 9 But extending the Templeton Doctrine to include the recapture of water which
has seeped back into a public groundwater basin would in no way
have furthered the Doctrine's basic purpose. The seepage which
Brantley sought to recover too closely resembles the return flows on
2 0 If
which so many western water rights wholly or partly depend.
the recovery of this water had been allowed, water rights along the
downstream segments of every watercourse in New Mexico could
conceivably have been impaired.
DEBORAH S. GROUT

16. In New Mexico, only groundwater in declared underground basins with reasonably
ascertainable boundaries is considered to be public water. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-12-1

(1978).
17. 76 N.M. at 472, 415 P.2d at 853.
18. __ N.M. at
, 587 P.2d at 429.
19. Flint, supra at 562-63.
20. W. HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN
THE WEST 331 (1942).

